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Abstract The familiar view that presuppositions are a variety of speaker com-
mitment is supported by the deviance that results from presupposing something
while undertaking incompatible commitments. Speaker commitments differ from
other speaker meaning in not being cancelable in discourse contexts that conflict
with them. Similarities and differences in projection patterns of presuppositions
and conversational implicatures—the latter are speaker meaning but not speaker
commitments—reveal both the ease with which projected conversational implica-
tures and their ilk can be mistaken for presuppositions, and also the importance of
not confounding them. Recent proposals (Simons, Tonhauser, Beaver & Roberts
2010; Simons, Beaver, Roberts & Tonhauser 2016) for a unitary account of all
projective content make projected presuppositions speaker meaning that is not a
speaker commitment. In addition to this problem, the proposals rest on a faulty
generalization about conditions in which projection occurs.
Keywords: presupposition, speaker commitment, projection
1 Varieties of speaker commitments and speaker meaning
1.1 Presuppositions are speaker commitments
Speech acts that utilize an expression with a presupposition commit their speaker to
presupposed propositions being true. This widely noted and generally accepted fact
is what originally led scholars to the question of how presuppositions differ from
other varieties of speaker commitment.
Consider an example. A speaker who asks (1),
(1) Was it Huck who dipped Becky’s pigtail in the inkwell?
commits herself to the truth of (2).
(2) Someone dipped Becky’s pigtail in the inkwell.
Asking the question makes this commitment even though the speaker is not commit-
ted to any stance on the issue of whether Huck did or didn’t dip Becky’s pigtail in
the inkwell. Exactly parallel observations hold of a speaker who states (3).
∗ I thank Cleo Condoravdi and Lauri Karttunen for comments on this work.
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(3) If it was Huck who dipped Becky’s pigtail in the inkwell, then the teacher
punished the wrong pupil.
Unlike statement (4),
(4) It was Huck who dipped Becky’s pigtail in the inkwell.
which cannot be true unless (2) is,1 question (1) does not entail (2)—questions
not ever being true, or for that matter false. Nor does conditional (3) entail that
Huck dipped Becky’s pigtail in the inkwell, thereby commiting the speaker to (2).
Of the trio (1), (3), (4) of sentences, only (4) commits its speaker to Huck having
dipped Becky’s pigtail in the inkwell. Thus the presupposition (2), which all three
expressions are generally taken to share, is not necessarily entailed by sentences that
presuppose it—although it can be entailed in addition to being presupposed, as is
the case with (4). Even (5), which also commits its speaker to (2), can arguably be
true without (2) being true.
(5) It wasn’t Huck who dipped Becky’s pigtail in the inkwell.
The pattern of presuppositions constituting speaker commitments across these
transformations of a declarative sentence is a useful diagnostic. It strikingly differ-
entiates presuppositions from declarative sentences’ assertive content, which is not
generally shared by their negation, the question formed from them, and conditionals
with them or their negation as antecedent. Of course, the fact that presuppositions,
such as the one triggered by the cleft construction, are quite generally shared by
related sentences does not in itself explain how presuppositions differ from other
varieties of speaker commitment. Rather it needs to be explained in terms of some
deeper distinction between presupposed and assertive content.
The Family of Sentences (FOS) Test for presupposition, as it is sometimes
called, is often expanded to include additional related sentences such as (6), with a
possibility modal, and others as well.
(6) Maybe it wasn’t Huck who dipped Becky’s pigtail in the inkwell.
Although the FOS test is quite useful for distinguishing what a declarative clause
asserts from other types of propositional content associated with the clause, it is not
determinative for presupposition, as section 1.2 discusses.
Before going there, though, let us take care to be certain we have not too easily
conceded that speech acts utilizing sentences (1), (3), (5), and (6) commit their
speaker to (2) being true. First we note the obvious fact that even in a conversation
where no party is committed to defend the truth of (2) until someone performs a
speech act with (1), (3), (4), (5), or (6), once the speech act is made the speaker
1 If Huck dipped Becky’s pigtail in the inkwell, it follows that someone did.
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is committed to (2). She cannot disavow the commitment without contradicting
herself. This is what makes discourse (7) deviant, except when the question expresses
skepticism concerning an earlier proposal that Huck dipped Becky’s pigtail in the
inkwell.
(7) Was it Huck who dipped Becky’s pigtail in the inkwell? (#)I’m not sure
anyone did.
It is quite generally anomalous to perform a speech act and then commit to a
conflict with its presuppositions. Only when the initial speech act can naturally
be understood as not actually committing its speaker to what the expression used
would otherwise presuppose is such a discourse felicitous. What Horn (1989) calls
metalinguistic negation is parallelled with metalinguistic questions, as (7) illustrates.
A corresponding example with negation would be (8).
(8) It wasn’t Huck who dipped Becky’s pigtail in the inkwell. (#)I’m not so sure
anyone did.
Stating (8) is anomalous unless prior context includes some kind of suggestion that
Huck dipped Becky’s pigtail in the inkwell. The contrast between (7)/(8) and (9)/(10)
is illuminating.
(9) Was it Huck who dipped Becky’s pigtail in the inkwell? I’m sure he didn’t.
(10) It wasn’t Huck who dipped Becky’s pigtail in the inkwell. I’m sure he didn’t.
Both (9) and (10) are fully acceptable in contexts where it has been proposed that
someone dipped Becky’s pigtail in the inkwell. Their felicity does not depend on
any prior suggestion or proposal that Huck is the culprit, and they both commit
their speakers to the presupposition (2). Indeed, they recommit their speaker to this
proposition even if she committed herself to it earlier; it’s immaterial who previously
proposed (2).
So the felicity conditions of (7) and (8) reveal a subtlety in practical application
of the FOS Test. So-called metalinguistic negatives and metalinguistic questions
need not inherit all presuppositions of the affirmative declarative sentence they are
related to. These special cases seem not to constitute a failure of presuppositions to
pass the FOS Test but instead to be cases in which propositions that would ordinarily
be presupposed are not, and instead fall with other content in the scope of negation
or querying.
Additional evidence reinforcing that speakers are committed to the presupposi-
tions of expressions they use in speech acts is this: explicit contradiction occurs when
these speakers contemporaneously have other commitments that are inconsistent
with the presuppositions. For example, discourse (11) would be deviant regardless
of what context it occurred in.
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(11) No one dipped Becky’s pigtail in the inkwell. #Was it Huck who did it?
When a speaker commits to some proposition then makes a speech act having a
presupposition inconsistent with that proposition, her self-contradiction is powerfully
evident. In such cases, even a metalinguistic use of questions is excluded; it would
call into question the speaker’s immediately preceding commitment. An equally
strong direct contradiction arises, resulting in a similar degree of infelicity, when
a speaker first performs a speech act then commits to something contradicting its
presupposition.
(12) Was it Huck who dipped Becky’s pigtail in the inkwell? #Nobody did.2
The strong contradictions in (11) and (12) show that speakers are committed to
propositions their utterances presuppose. So theories of presupposition must be
consistent with presuppositions actually being speaker commitments—indeed, they
should account for this fact.
1.2 Conversational implicatures and the FOS test
Conversational implicatures differ from presuppositions in key respects. However,
they have enough similarities to create potential for confusion.
Grice (1989) convincingly demonstrated that speakers can successfully mean
and communicate certain propositions their speech acts do not commit them to,
and introduced the term conversational implicature for such propositions. On
Grice’s theory, and most subsequent elaborations of it, conversational implicatures
arise when a listener must recognize on certain pragmatic grounds that the speaker
likely believes these propositions: were the speaker not to believe them, general
or particular features of the current conversational context could not be adequately
reconciled with the hypothesis that the speaker’s speech act fulfills requirements for
the communicative action to be rational.
2 Interestingly, metalinguistic negation seems more capable of rescuing felicity in cases like these.
Discourse (i) is perhaps an acceptable way of disagreeing with someone else’s earlier statement that
Huck dipped Becky’s pigtail in the inkwell.
(i) No one dipped Becky’s pigtail in the inkwell. (#)It wasn’t Huck who did it.
In this case, it appears to be rhetorically felicitous to follow up a broad initial refutation with a more
specific metalinguistic negative statement to reinforce the point of disagreement. It may also be
rhetorically acceptable to place the broader assertion after the metalinguistic negative statement when
disagreeing with another’s claim that Huck dipped Becky’s pigtail in the inkwell.
(ii) It wasn’t Huck who dipped Becky’s pigtail in the inkwell. (#)No one did.
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Conversationally implicated propositions, though meant by the speaker, are no
part of the linguistic meaning of the expression uttered. Nor does the speech act com-
mit the speaker to them being true. The latter fact is the reason why conversational
implicatures (i) do not arise in the first place if the speaker is seen to be committed
to something incompatible with them and (ii) also are not present—in Grice’s termi-
nology are cancelled—if the speaker follows up a speech act that could conceivably
conversationally implicate them with a commitment that is incompatible. Consider
some examples. Statement (13),
(13) Some students passed the course.
quite generally conversationally implicates that some students didn’t pass, and
statement (14A),
(14) Q: Shall we go to the movies tonight?
A: I have an exam tomorrow.
conversationally implicates in discourse (14), though not in general, that the re-
spondent won’t go to the movies. Because speakers are not committed to either
implicature, no anomaly exists in discourse (15) or answer (16A).
(15) Some students passed the course. In fact, all did.
(16) Q: Shall we go to the movies tonight?
A: Sure, though I need to study for an exam tomorrow.
The conversational implicature that would likely have been communicated had
these speakers not committed themselves to something incompatible with it sim-
ply does not arise. The existence of an incompatible proposition does not render
these discourses deviant, as would happen if speech acts committed their speaker
to propositions that could be conversationally implicated. This contrasts sharply
with the behavior presuppositions manifested in discourses (11) and (12). Potential
conversational implicatures simply fail to actualize when they would conflict with
speaker commitments. Discourses (15) and (16) do not even require special precon-
ditions for felicity like (7) and (8) in order to avoid deviance. Plainly, conversational
implicatures never are speaker commitments.
Many conversational implicatures that speakers generally mean to convey with
an expression such as the quantificational determiner some, though no part of the
expression’s linguistic meaning, nevertheless have a strong association with it. This is
why the discovery that conversational implicatures are not part of these expressions’
meaning has had such a transformative impact on linguistic semantics and the
philosophy of language. Interestingly, when a clause containing such an expression
is embedded in a larger construction, generalized conversational implicatures often
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seem to project to the resulting sentence. For example, many English speakers judge
that all four sentences in (17),
(17) a. Jim was forced to whitewash the fence.
b. Jim wasn’t forced to whitewash the fence.
c. If Jim was forced to whitewash the fence, Tom should be punished.
d. Was Jim forced to whitewash the fence?
share an implication that Jim whitewashed the fence. As the data in (18) show, only
(17a) actually commits its speaker to this proposition, indicating that the implication
in question is something like a conversational implicature associated with the verb
force and is definitely not a presupposition.3
(18) a. Jim was forced to whitewash the fence #but he didn’t whitewash it.
b. Jim wasn’t forced to whitewash the fence and he didn’t whitewash it.
c. If Jim was forced to whitewash the fence, Tom should be punished; but
Jim didn’t whitewash it.
d. Was Jim forced to whitewash the fence? Or did he not whitewash it?
The potential conversational implicature, or whatever it is, fails to actualize as
speaker meaning in the completely felicitous discourses (18b-d) because it would
conflict with things the speaker is committed to or, in the case of (18d), she makes
clear she is not committed to.
Two conclusions follow from these contrasts. First, presuppositions are quite
different things than conversational implicatures even though both form part of what
speakers mean. In particular, presuppositions are speaker commitments whereas
conversational implicatures are not. Second, the FOS Test as usually applied does
not distinguish conversational implicatures from presuppositions.
The fact that conversational implicatures, when present, are part of a speaker’s
meaning together with the fact that they pass the FOS Test as usually applied opens
the door wide to the possibility of confounding conversational implicatures with
presuppositions. Theorizing about presuppositions and their projection in the latter
1970s brought forth numerous proposals that presuppositions are conversational
implicatures, or at least close relatives of them (e.g., Atlas, Boër, Kempson, Levinson,
Lycan, Wilson). A clear understanding that not all speaker meaning rests on a speaker
commitment brings out why this initially appealing approach to presupposition
cannot ultimately succeed: presuppositions are in fact speaker commitments.
Of course, today’s far more extensive empirical grasp of data concerning projec-
tion of various types of content was not available then. Now we can see that a wide




range of varieties of propositional content that are distinct from asserted content
project in patterns that are similar but not identical to each other.
1.3 Karttunen’s (1973) refinement of presupposition projection
Although Langendoen & Savin (1979) proposed that presuppositions project to ex-
pressions cumulatively from expressions they contain, Karttunen showed definitively
in (1973) that projection is not as simple as this. While presuppositions project
from the antecedent of conditionals, as illustrated earlier, they do not always project
from the consequent of a conditional. For instance, the presupposition of (19) that
Mary has a brother, which is associated with the definite possessive in (19), does not
project in (20).
(19) Mary won’t let her brother be bullied.
(20) If Mary has a brother, she won’t let her brother be bullied.
The felicity of (21) shows that (20) lacks this presupposition.
(21) I’m sure Mary doesn’t have a brother; but if she does, she won’t let her
brother be bullied.
Note for comparison the deviance of (22), in which the presupposition does project
from the conditional’s antecedent.
(22) I’m sure Mary doesn’t have a brother. #But if she won’t let her brother be
bullied, that is admirable.
Karttunen demonstrated that presuppositions of a conditional’s consequent clause
are selectively filtered. All project except those that are hypothetically supposed
in the antecedent clause. Intuitively (23a) commits the speaker to Mary having a
brother; and the deviance of discourse (23b) confirms this intuitive judgment.
(23) a. If I know Mary, she won’t let her brother be bullied.
b. I’m sure Mary doesn’t have a brother. #And if I know Mary, she won’t let
her brother be bullied.
Related observations, only a little more complex to describe, concern presupposition
filtering in coordinations with the conjunctions and and or.
These departures from cumulative projection of presuppositions are highly regu-
lar. Any description of the phenomenon of presupposition must capture them, and





Grice himself pointed to the existence of speaker commitments that are not part of
asserted content.4 These he termed conventional implicature (1989).5 Conventional
implicatures also pass the FOS Test as commonly applied, projecting similarly to
presuppositions as well as to conversational implicatures.
(24) a. Huck, that michievous rascal, dipped Becky’s pigtail in the inkwell
#and Huck isn’t a mischievous rascal.
b. Huck, that michievous rascal, didn’t dip Becky’s pigtail in the inkwell
#and Huck isn’t a mischievous rascal.
c. If Huck, that michievous rascal, dipped Becky’s pigtail in the inkwell, the
teacher punished the wrong pupil; #but Huck isn’t a mischievous rascal.
d. Did Huck, that michievous rascal, dip Becky’s pigtail in the inkwell?
#I’m aware that Huck isn’t a mischievous rascal.
As the deviance of (24a–d) demonstrates, conventional implicatures are a variety of
speaker commitment, like presuppositions.
Karttunen & Peters (1979) proposed that many presuppositions are in fact con-
ventional implicatures, a view that is not widely accepted today. While the two
varieties of speaker commitment share a number of characteristics, they are thought
to differ sufficiently that many scholars believe they are distinct species. One more
characteristic they share is that both are subsidiary speaker commitments rather than
primary ones, as shown by the contrasts in the following question/answer pairs.
(25) Q: Did someone offend Sue?
A1: #It was James who offended Sue.
A2: James offended Sue.
(26) Q: Was Dewey a New Yorker? And who ran against Truman in 1948?
A1: #Dewey, who was a New Yorker, ran against Truman in 1948.
A2: Yes, Dewey was a New Yorker, and it was he who ran against Truman
in 1948.
In each case answer A2 commits the speaker to the same propositions as answer A1.
But committing to responsive information in a subsidiary manner, as a presupposition
or a conventional implicature, is often infelicitous in answering a question. Often,
though not always as we shall later see, for the answer to be felicitous speakers
should make a primary commitment to the information requested.
4 Being speaker commitments, they perforce are not conversational implicatures.
5 Unhappily, in my opinion, as they are no more closely related to conversational implicatures than to
asserted content, i.e., to what is said—in his terminology.
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2 Patterns of projection
The preceding subsections illustrated not only some commonalities but also some
differences in the patterns in which presuppositions, conversational implicatures, and
other types of non-asserted speaker meaning project. Both the commonalities and
the differences are relevant to recent proposals that all content that projects should
receive a unitary account of when and where it projects.
2.1 Unitary projection?
As Simons et al. 2010 put it,
While it is possible to analyze projection piecemeal, clearly a
unitary explanation is to be preferred. Yet we show that standard
explanations of projective behavior (common ground based theories,
anaphoric theories, and multi-dimensional theories) do not extend
to the full range of triggers. Instead, we propose an alternative ex-
planation based on the following claim, which is intended to ap-
ply to all content which occurs in embedded contexts: Meanings
project IFF they are not at-issue, where at-issueness is defined in
terms of the [sic] Roberts’ (1996) discourse theory. Thus, and despite
their apparent heterogeneity, projective meaning triggers emerge as a
natural class on the basis of the not at-issue status of their projective
inference.
(emphasis added). The authors’ stated purpose in this paper is to tie projection
intimately to discourse structure. They intend their “claim that projection is a
consequence of the scope of sentential operators such as negation, conditionals and
modals typically being limited roughly to what is understood as the main point, or,
in the terminology we will use, the at-issue content of the utterance” to make the
desired linkage. “Whatever does not belong to the main point — the not-at-issue
content — is left out of the scope of the operator, and hence projects.” Explicitly,
“the specific hypotheses we will defend are these:
(27) [= their (12)]] Hypotheses about what projects and why
a. All and only those implications of (embedded) sentences which are not-
at-issue relative to the Question Under Discussion in the context have the
potential to project.
b. Operators (modals, negation, etc.) target at-issue content.”





The former has to do with expressions such as clauses, and appears on its face
to include asserted content, presupposed content, and conventionally implicated
content. The latter has to do with utterances (speech acts) and discourse context.
The property of content being at issue is defined by the authors in terms of relevance
to questions under discussion in an utterance’s context. Here is their definition of
relevance.
(28) [= their (13)]] “Relevance to the QUD
a. An assertion is relevant to a QUD iff it contextually entails a partial or
complete answer to the QUD.
b. A question is relevant to a QUD iff it has an answer which contextually
entails a partial or complete answer to the QUD.”
The paper presents two non-equivalent definitions of content being at issue.
“[T]he basic definition of at-issueness is:
(29) [= their (14)]
A proposition p is at-issue relative to a question Q iff ?p is relevant to Q.”
This definition makes proposition p at issue wrt question Q iff either p entails a
partial or complete answer to Q or ¬p entails a partial or complete answer to Q.
The basic definition is strictly semantic—except to the extent that context brings
propositions besides p or ¬p into answering Q.
(30) [= their (26)]
“Revised definition of at-issueness
a. A proposition p is at-issue iff the speaker intends to address the QUD via
?p.
b. An intention to address the QUD via ?p is felicitous only if:
i. ?p is relevant to the QUD, and
ii. the speaker can reasonably expect the addressee to recognize this inten-
tion.”
This definition makes whether proposition p is at issue (wrt question Q) entirely
dependent on the speaker’s intentions vis-à-vis addressing the question under dis-
cussion. Only secondarily does it introduce the possibility that such intentions of the
speaker would be infelicitous if either p is not relevant to the question (as defined in
(28)) or it is unreasonable for the speaker to expect the addressee to recognize her
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intention. Obviously such a definition greatly complicates the problem of empirically
evaluating claim (27) about when content projects.
A subsequent paper, Simons et al. 2016, undertakes to clarify the problem with a
third way of characterizing exactly when p is at issue: a statement’s Current Question
(CQ) does not entail p and can be relevant to the context’s Discourse Question (DQ)
without the speaker believing p. The notion of a statement’s CQ introduced in the
paper refers, roughly, to the set of alternatives among which the speaker intends
the statement to distinguish. This is a way of trying to define what question the
speaker intends her statement to address. Relevance to the DQ, the question under
discussion, is then assessed indirectly via the CQ: Does some answer to the CQ
entail at least a partial answer to the DQ?
Simons et al. 2010’s proposed unitary explanation of projection—“Whatever
does not belong to the . . . at-issue content . . . is left out of the scope of the operator,
and hence projects”—is at least partially retracted by Simons et al. 2016’s assertion
that “In . . . Tonhauser et al. 2013, we demonstrated that there are several subtypes of
not-at-issue, projective content. It is entirely plausible that each subtype becomes
projective through different mechanisms.” (emphasis added) Accordingly, the
next section’s discussion is organized around the claimed generalization as much as
their proposed explanations of it.
2.2 Assessing the unitary hypothesis
The claim that content of a clause projects if and only if it is not at issue in the
discourse context is a bold generalization. Obviously it can only be substantiated
through meticulous clarification and thorough empirical evaluation. A very basic
check on its viability would be to show it explains the kind of selective filtering of
presuppositions Karttunen (1973) discovered (see section 1.3). However, this key
challenge has not been met to date.
My purpose here is not a detailed assessment of Simons et al.’s proposals in light
of their varying definitions of what is at issue in the context of a given utterance.
Rather I first present two empirically grounded observations that directly conflict
with the generalization they state and aim to explain, that is with (31).
(31) Propositional content of an embedded clause projects IFF it is not at issue in
the context.
I then point out a fundamental conflict at the heart of their argumentation.
One direct challenge to their generalization is the fact that presuppositions, and
conventional implicatures as well, can project even when they directly answer an ex-
plicit question. As one example, Karttunen (2016: §4.2) shows that presuppositions
project from temporal clauses as answers to direct questions. As another example, in
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discourse (32) the respondent answers a question with the projected presupposition:
Billy is the neighbor kid who keeps ringing John’s doorbell and running away.
(32) Q: Which neighbor kid keeps ringing John’s doorbell and running away?
A: John is beside himself with frustration. He hasn’t figured out it’s Billy.
The projected proposition is clearly at issue in this context no matter how one hopes
to formally define that intuitive notion. That (32A) commits its speaker to this
presupposition is shown by the deviance of answering (32Q) with (33A).
(33) A: John is beside himself with frustration. He hasn’t figured out it’s Billy,
#and I’m quite sure it isn’t.
This deviance stems from the explicit contradiction to which the answerer has
committed herself, and the consequent the failure of (33A) to answer (32Q). So the
left-to-right direction of (31) is not universally true. Being at issue doesn’t always
prevent content from projecting.
A second direct challenge is that not-at-issue meaning doesn’t always project.
Abundant clear examples exist. Consider just two. Statement (34a) has the implica-
tion that John has something chartreuse, and (34b) has the implication that the box
was not wrapped just before the pre-utterance time referred to.
(34) a. John has a chartreuse shirt.
b. Mary wrapped the box.
Both of these implied propositions are seldom ever at issue. Quite generally, in
contexts where neither is at issue, (35a) does not indicate that John has something
chartreuse.
(35) a. John doesn’t have a chartreuse shirt.
b. Mary didn’t wrap the box.
Nor does (35b) imply that the box was not already wrapped at the past reference
time; stating (35b) usually says nothing about whether the box had wrappings during
the period preceding the reference time. Like innumerable other propositions that
form part of asserted content, these two usually do not project when they are not at
issue.
This empirical fact and the preceding one constitute counterexamples to both
directions of generalization (31). Neither a unitary explanation of projection nor
piecemeal analyses can validate the generalization (quoted verbatim at the start of
section 2.1) since the biconditional does not actually hold in either direction. So an
analysis of projection that predicts generalization (31) has a strike against it for that
very reason, rather than a point in its favor.
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A more fundamental problem with the unifying program stems from its failure to
distinguish between speaker meaning and speaker commitment. As we saw in section
1, speaker commitments project even when projecting puts them in conflict with some
aspect of utterance context. For example, (11), (12), (22), (23b), (24a–d), and non-
metalinguistic uses of (7) and (8) illustrate that projection of speaker commitments
is not prevented by conflict with context. The only ‘projected’ propositions that
speakers mean that cancel in contexts where they are at issue are not speaker
commitments but things like conversational implicatures, as illustrated in section
1.2. For a proposition p that would ordinarily project as a speaker commitment, p
being at issue in context does not stop it from projecting.
Presuppositions are not just speaker meaning but speaker commitments. This has
the consequence that presuppositions cannot be blocked from projecting in virtue
of being at issue in context. Neither can conventional implicatures. The flip side of
this same coin is that treating a generalization like (31) as a projection mechanism
inescapably fails to make projected propositions speaker commitments. It follows
that (31) could not be the mechanism that projects presuppositions—or conventional
implicatures—even if this biconditional were empirically unexceptionable. At most
such a mechanism could project propositions to be speaker meaning. Even then a
mechanism for producing speaker meaning which is as stipulative as biconditional
(31) would compare unfavorably with, for example, Grice’s explanation of how
conversational implicatures arise.
The more restricted mechanism presented in Simons et al. (2016) for project-
ing the factive presupposition of sentences like (36) has greater potential to be
explanatory—or would if it made the projected proposition a speaker commitment.6
(36) Jane doesn’t know it’s raining.
This account, which requires speakers to believe it is raining but does not commit
them to the proposition, is consistent with generalization (31) in not projecting the
complement of “know” when it is at issue, while often projecting it when it is not at
issue.7 By not making the projected proposition a speaker commitment, however, the
mechanism fails to project the proposition as a presupposition. Although the paper
calls projected propositions “speaker commitments” throughout, it accurately likens
its account of why speakers should believe projected propositions to Grice’s analysis
6 A substantial literature has demonstrated that the verb “know” is not always factive. However, all
examples discussed herein are.
7 The requirement for speakers to believe the complement of “know” when it is not at issue depends
on the verb’s veridicality. An empirical problem with the account is that “prove” also is veridical
(entails that its complement is true), but unlike “know” is not factive. For example, stating (i),
(i) Stieltjes didn’t prove that the Riemann Hypothesis is true.
does not require a speaker to believe that the Riemann Hypothesis is true.
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of conversational implicatures. The paper’s confound of speaker meaning with
speaker commitment is on vivid display in the following statement: “the interpreter’s
job is just to determine what the speaker is presenting as her commitments.” Grice, in
contrast, took pains to make clear that his account of conversational implicature via
interpreters’ reasoning explains interpreters’ ability to recognize speaker meaning
that is not a commitment.
Simons et al. 2016’s disregard of the critical difference is crystalized in its
account of how the speaker of (37A) communicates to the person who asked (37Q)
that the car is parked in the garage, even though “believe” is not a factive verb.
(37) Q: Why is it taking Phil so long to get here?
A: He didn’t believe that the car’s parked in the parking garage.
The proposed analysis of this case is, as the authors say, essentially similar to
what their approach requires if “believe” is replaced by “know” in answer to this
question.8 However, the lack of anomaly in discourses such as (38) shows that the
two cases differ critically in what the respondent commits to. A speaker of (38A) is
not required to believe the car is parked in the garage, whereas someone who said
“know” instead of “believe” would be committed to this proposition.
(38) Q: Why is it taking Phil so long to get here?
A: He didn’t believe that the car’s parked in the parking garage, and a good
thing too. He just texted me that the garage attendants moved it to the
street, where he finally found it.
When “know” is substituted for “believe” in (38A), a contradiction results.
(39) A: He didn’t know that the car’s parked in the parking garage, and a good
thing too. #He just texted me that the garage attendants moved it to the street,
where he finally found it.
The deviance of this response shows that projection is not blocked in (39). Because
the presupposition of “know” projects, a speaker who says “know” really is com-
mitted to the complement being true. It is erroneous to equate (i) the conversational
implicature-like reasoning that indicates the complement clause is believed by a
speaker who says “believe” in (37A) with (ii) the crucially different mechanism that
projects the presupposition of “know” as a speaker commitment in responding with
(39A) to question (38Q).
In summary, both papers’ discussion of projection as a unitary phenomenon
suffers from insufficient attention to when ‘projected’ propositions truly are speaker
commitments, on the one hand, and when they are speaker meaning but not commit-
ments, like conversational implicatures, on the other hand.




Section 1 argued that presuppositions and conventional implicatures are, like the
assertive content of declarative sentences, propositions to whose truth speakers
commit themselves. It also recalled Grice’s argument that these types of speaker
meaning differ substantially from conversational implicatures, which are a type of
speaker meaning to whose truth speakers do not commit themselves. In combination
these arguments yield the conclusion that an adequate theory of presuppositions
and how they project over embedding constructions must give presuppositions the
character of speaker commitments. Theories that don’t are inadequate because they
fail to capture an essential characteristic of presuppositions.
Section 2 argued that a prominent contemporary theory which aims to unify
presupposition projection with projection of conventional implicatures, and even
of assertive content, fails to make projected presuppositions speaker commitments.
The conclusion that this theory is not adequate was further supported with evidence
that assertive content which projects in situations for which this theory provides an
account is genuinely not a speaker commitment; it is instead akin to conversational
implicature: interpreter identifiable speaker meaning to which the speaker is not
committed. Contrasting evidence showed that in a similar situation speakers are
committed to projected presuppositions. Additionally, evidence was presented
against the claim that content which is at issue never projects, as well as evidence
against the proposition that all content projects if it is not at issue.
In conclusion, presupposition has different linguistic behavior than assertive con-
tent. Careful attention to the distinction between speaker commitment and speaker
meaning that does not involve speaker commitment reveals that presuppositions’
projective behavior is different from assertive content’s. A theory of presupposition
must explain why speakers are committed to projected presuppositions as much as
they are to locally triggered ones. A theory of assertive content projection needs to
explain how and when assertive content ‘projects’ without speakers being committed
to it.
I observe in closing that there is no need for an explanation of how or why
conversational implicatures ‘project’ when they do. Conversational implicatures
associated with expressions in subordinate clauses only ‘project’ to a larger embed-
ding sentence when Gricean reasoning applies to the full embedding sentence (see
(17) and (18)).
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